


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26 November 1962^{25X1}

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DAILY BRIEF

*Guatemala: Both rightist and leftist elements will probably continue plotting to oust Guatemalan President Ydigoras even though the rebellion of air force units on 25 November failed.

Senior army officers, whose action forced the rebel leaders to give up the revolt within three hours after the first attack, are in a strong position. They may try to force Ydigoras to resign in favor of a military junta, mainly to prevent the return from Mexico of former president Arevalo.

Arevalo, whose antipathy toward the United States and tolerance of Communists during his presidency have not destroyed his popular appeal, has formally announced his candidacy for the presidency in the 1963 elections.

There is no evidence to confirm Ydigoras' charge that the air force revolt had Castro-Communist support; rather it probably was backed by conservatives. The unrest aroused, however, may encourage Communist groups [redacted] to take advantage of any rightist coup attempt. [redacted]

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*India - Communist China - Pakistan: The cease-fire continues to be observed by both sides.

The Indian foreign secretary believes that the Chinese troop withdrawal announced by Peiping as a unilateral measure is actually conditional on New Delhi's acceptance of Peiping's proposals. Nevertheless, responsible Indian officials appear unwilling to accept the proposals as a package. The request to the Chinese for further "clarification" is partly designed to stall for time while New Delhi continues to avoid committing itself to a definite position.

The Indian Defense Ministry, gravely concerned about the threat from China, continues to redeploy forces from the Pakistani border. In one section of India's border with East Pakistan where there have been frequent clashes in the past, all troops except the border police have been removed.

Anxious over Western actions to improve India's military capabilities, the Pakistani Government is giving tacit encouragement to popular demands for a realignment of foreign policy. The press is being permitted to speculate on a possible non-aggression pact with Communist China, without comment by the government.

The Pakistanis may hope to use the reported Chinese offer of a non-aggression pact to put further pressure on its Western allies and on India. At the same time, Pakistani officials are indicating that Pakistan will stand by its alliances with the West. Foreign Minister Mohammad Ali has assured the US Embassy that he will not visit Communist China during the Sino-Indian border crisis, saying President Ayub had ruled against this.

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*France: The 25 November election resulted in a National Assembly heavily committed to De Gaulle, thus assuring the French President the domestic stability he needs to pursue his vigorous foreign policy.

Although the Union for a New Republic fell short of an absolute majority, it did far better than its most ardent proponents had originally hoped for. The Gaullists are assured firm control of the assembly because a number of Popular Republican and Independent deputies are personally committed to De Gaulle.

The Communists were the only other group to win more seats than they expected two weeks ago. They now have enough deputies to qualify for recognition as a political unit in the assembly, but their relative importance in the legislature is little changed.

On the broader national political scene, however, the Communists have succeeded in breaking out of the political isolation to which they have been confined for most of the postwar period. They have avoided "popular-front" propaganda and their strategy will probably be to win acceptance as part of the democratic resistance to one-party rule. They can be expected to make a special appeal to Socialist "comrades," and to press subtle exploitation of the electoral debt owed them by such prominent Socialists as Guy Mollet and Jules Moch.

De Gaulle's desire for continuity means Georges Pompidou will probably be reappointed as premier and few cabinet changes are likely. The new government will press quickly for assembly approval of the

budget. It will also announce a policy based on continued economic expansion, while taking steps to satisfy farm and labor elements which pose the major threat to internal political stability.

De Gaulle will interpret the election as support for his efforts to give France an important international status. This will probably be apparent in stiff bargaining on Britain's bid for Common Market membership, in renewed efforts to revise NATO, and in stronger insistence on having French views considered on East-West differences.

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Congo: Premier Adoula's chances of surviving efforts of the parliamentary opposition to overthrow his government appear to have increased.

The president of the lower house reportedly refused on 24 November to inscribe "for several more days" a censure motion against the government. Since such a motion cannot come to a vote until two days after it is inscribed, the US Embassy feels that Adoula may be able to reshuffle his cabinet sufficiently to blunt the attacks of the still-divided opposition.

The opposition, however, is encouraged by the ease with which motions rescinding recent government actions were passed on 23 November. It may demand more cabinet changes than Adoula is prepared to make,

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President Kasavubu is said to be determined not to dissolve or to adjourn Parliament as a way out of the crisis.

Laos: Prince Souphanouvong, who recently visited Moscow, Peiping and Hanoi, apparently returned with instructions to adopt at least the semblance of a more cooperative attitude toward the coalition government.

Premier Souvanna Phouma reported on 23 November that Souphanouvong had agreed in principle to an integrated 6,000-man national police force. Additionally, agreement was "virtually" achieved on the future composition of a national army.

Souvanna, whose efforts toward reunification have been persistently stymied by Pathet Lao obstructionism during the past few months, remains suspicious of Souphanouvong's intentions. He indicated that the "real test" will come in the next three or four weeks, when Souphanouvong's performance on specific issues becomes clear.

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*Costa Rica: President Orlich believes that Communists were involved in the riot that resulted in several deaths on 23 November in Cartago, Costa Rica's second largest city.

The rioting developed out of a large protest meeting against a recent increase in electric power rates. Costa Rica's Popular Vanguard (Communist) Party has sought to exploit popular dissatisfaction with the rate increase.

[redacted] At the last party congress in April the Communists chose leaders favoring terrorism. Previously, the party had relied chiefly on propaganda and legal action.

The Orlich government will probably now adopt more stringent measures against the Communists, who heretofore have not been considered a serious threat. [redacted]

Common Market - Britain: Negotiations on British accession to the European Common Market (EEC) will continue well into 1963, in the opinion of an EEC official who has had a leading role in the talks.

The official considers it "quite realistic" to assume that the UK will enter the EEC on 1 January 1964, "assuming the UK accepts the EEC positions." He believes that the economic issues involved in accession may be resolved in about two months, but he foresees more prolonged discussion of institutional arrangements and of the problems of the UK's partners in the European Free Trade Area.

The EEC official agrees that the UK must have a "victory" before the negotiations end. He feels it will be difficult for the EEC to agree to a major tariff reduction on items of special interest to the UK, however, and says that the Six are united in opposing London's request to continue deficiency payments to its farmers.

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